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It is something of a truism to observe that the “law on books” does not always mirror the law in practice, and this is particularly true
for criminal law. As William Stuntz observed, federal criminal law is both broad and deep—broad in that it covers a large category of
behaviors prohibited by state criminal law, and deep in that it criminalizes many types of behaviors many times over.[1]   Resources for
federal prosecutors did not grow at a rate proportionate to this federalized criminal law over the past thirty years, however, leaving
U.S. attorneys and their assistants a surplus of agency referrals from which to choose. Consequently, “there is an enormous amount
that federal prosecutors can do . . . but very little that they must do.”[2] For this reason, scholars seek to understand prosecutorial
decision making.
Research considers the behavior of local prosecutors,[3] the relationship between attorneys for government agencies and those in
the Department of Justice,[4] and Önally the relationship between Department lawyers and federal prosecutors in the 94 U.S.
Attorneys’ ofÖces spread throughout the country.[5] A central concern in the study of prosecutors is how to understand the forces
that motivate their decisions: why do they prosecute some types of crime but not others, and what factors in×uence their decision
making? Local prosecutors, particularly those who face elections, appear to be responsive to the political preferences of the
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communities in which they reside.[6] U.S. attorneys are appointed rather than elected, and face a more complex network of in×uence.
On the one hand, U.S. attorneys serve at the pleasure of the president and are beholden to the prosecutorial priorities of the attorney
general.[7] These centralizing in×uences may incline federal prosecutors to pursue national priorities. On the other, the American
system of federal prosecution is decentralized (in comparison to the systems of France or Japan, for instance)[8] precisely because we
want federal prosecutors to be responsive to local political culture and concerns.[9] Federal prosecutors serve multiple masters.[10]
But what happens should these masters disagree as to which types of criminal prosecutions merit prioritization?
In this article, we extend the theoretical and empirical understanding of prosecutorial decision making by examining the case study of
federal obscenity prosecutions. Press coverage of modern American politics has emphasized regional differences in political and
cultural values, frequently characterized in terms of red states and blue states. Scholars disagree about the extent of this partisan
polarization and its effects on political outcomes,[11] though most agree that the “culture war” is being waged on the battleÖeld of
social issues, particularly policies concerning sexual mores.[12] If the culture war theory is accurate—and one must prove that it is—
regional variations in both local and federal obscenity prosecutions might mirror the larger localized culture wars.[13] But if federal
prosecutors are responsive primarily to centralizing forces rather than local in×uence, the crucial variable to explaining obscenity
prosecutions would not be a red-blue state dichotomy, but rather the priorities of a given presidential administration. Presidential
preferences, as articulated by the attorney general, may overcome local political culture. Since the Reagan administration’s Meese
Commission Report on Pornography, conservative and evangelical groups such as Focus on the Family, the American Family
Association, and Concerned Women for America have fought pornography.[14] Attorney General Gonzales made the prosecution of
obscenity crimes a top priority of the Department of Justice.[15] Presuming one can demonstrate Örst that local political culture
varies in a way that affects the desirability of bringing obscenity prosecutions, and second that presidents themselves have different
priorities in these matters, one can study these various in×uences on federal prosecutorial discretion.
We employed a mixed methods approach to examine this question. We analyzed state and local obscenity indictments from 1990-
2006 in order to see if the red-blue state distinction in fact possessed any explanatory leverage. Finding that it did, we then analyzed
federal obscenity prosecutions from 1995-2007 in order to determine the interplay between local and nationalized sources of
in×uence. Finally, we interviewed multiple experts in the area of obscenity prosecutions, including criminal defense attorneys who
specialize in defending the adult entertainment industry, law enforcement ofÖcials who specialize in these types of prosecutions, and
members of the industry itself in order to gain insight into our quantitative Öndings. Our results yield three conclusions. First, both
local political culture and presidential partisanship helped explain the tendency of federal prosecutors to bring obscenity cases.
Second—and most important—federal prosecutors employ “charge stacking” strategies as a way of navigating the sometimes
competing political forces that in×uence them. It is a mechanism by which federal prosecutors can attempt to serve contradictory
constituencies. Third, as a policy matter the strategies of both local and federal prosecutors may send mixed signals to would-be
wrongdoers that ultimately erode the deterrent value of obscenity prosecutions.
Part One below provides background on prosecutorial decision making, the culture war debate, and the law and politics of obscenity
prosecutions. Part Two presents our methodology. In Part Three we offer our results, which we discuss in Part Four. We conclude with
Part Five.
I. Prosecutorial decision making and the culture wars
          A. Prosecutorial decision making
If one were to describe the American system of criminal prosecution in a word, it would be “fragmented.” The United States has over
3,000 prosecutorial organizations divided amongst federal, state, and local governments,[16] and while such an approach may seem
familiar to us, it is very different from those in countries to which we usually compare ourselves. All French prosecutors, whether
located in Paris, Lyons, or Cannes, work for the same organization, the Ministry of Justice, which issues instructions and policy
guidelines to regional chief prosecutors’ ofÖces.[17] German prosecutors are career civil servants who work within a hierarchically
structured institutional system complete with meritocratic promotion and close oversight by their immediate supervisors.[18] Japan
has a single national procuracy, hierarchically organized and staffed by careerists.[19] The Supreme Public Prosecutors OfÖce in
Tokyo supervises eight high, Öfty district, and 452 local ofÖces which are staffed by prosecutors (kenji) and assistant prosecutors
(fukukenji). These ofÖces are bound by the “principle of prosecutor unity,” which provides that “the procuracy is a national, united,
hierarchical structure in which superiors command and subordinates obey and all prosecutors form one body.”[20]
America is different. In addition to being fragmented between federal, state, and local prosecutorial institutions, the American federal
prosecutorial system is itself extremely decentralized due to historical circumstance, constitutional structure and cultural norms.
United States attorneys were created by the Judiciary Act of 1789 with the task of representing the federal government in federal
district courts.[21] Serving as the “chief law enforcement ofÖcer for the judicial district in which they reside,” they are nominated by
the president and conÖrmed by the Senate for positions of four years.[22] The attorney general was given no authority over U.S.
attorneys by the 1789 Act, and it was not until the creation of the Department of Justice in 1870 that the attorney general was given
statutory authority to supervise U.S. attorneys.[23] Indeed, the Örst government ofÖcial to have supervisory authority over U.S.
attorneys was the Solicitor of the Treasury, who was granted this authority in the 1830s and retained it—in obvious tension with the
authority of the attorney general—until 1933. As struggles developed over the course of New Deal litigation, President Roosevelt
issued an executive order clarifying once and for all the Department’s ultimate authority over all federal litigation and reafÖrming the
attorney general’s authority over U.S. attorneys.[24] The fact that U.S. attorneys predate the Department of Justice helps to explain
why they were never historically viewed as mere Öeld agents of the attorney general.
A second explanation for the fragmented American approach to prosecution is that it is, to some extent, required by the constitution.
The federal structure of the American political system guarantees at the very least that federal prosecutors will operate
independently of their state counterparts, making a single, unitary Ministry of Justice such as those in France or Japan an
impossibility. Similarly, the constitutional requirement of separation of powers creates a political environment in which Congress,
when at odds with the executive over matters of legal policy making during periods of divided government, seeks to fragment federal
prosecutorial authority so as to limit the Department’s—and hence the President’s—in×uence over legal decision making.[25]
Finally, American cultural and professional norms help explain the comparative lack of prosecutorial unity. As Kagan explains, the
American legal system is “designed to limit central authority’s potential for tyranny or political bias . . . power is fragmented among
many governmental bodies, often staffed by locally elected ofÖcials.”[26] We do not vest total control of the federal prosecutorial
power in the Department of Justice because our political culture is unwilling to trust any government institution with that much
authority. Further, the professional norms of American lawyers in general, and prosecutors in particular, emphasize the manipulability
of the law and the need for creative legal analysis rather than strict adherence to predetermined guidelines or hierarchical oversight.
It was precisely these norms which led Carter, in his 1974 analysis of local prosecutors, to conclude that hierarchical control was
incompatible with the task environment of American prosecutors.[27]
The relationship between the Department of Justice and the ninety-four U.S. attorneys’ ofÖces has not remained static over time, of
course. During the late 20th century criminal law became increasingly federalized; by the mid-1990s there were over 3,000 federal
criminal offenses, leading one legal scholar who wrote on behalf of the Attorney General’s Roundtable on the Federalization of Crime
to claim that “by virtually any measure, the federal government is playing an increasingly important rule in the enforcement of
criminal law.” [28] As criminal law became federalized, federal prosecutors found that there was a far larger variety of behaviors they
could prosecute, thus raising the possibility that U.S. attorneys would pursue different priorities than the president or the attorney
general. It is unsurprising that the Department increasingly has sought to exert more direct control over U.S. attorneys and their
decision-making,[29] and U.S. attorneys are expected to conform to the prosecutorial priorities of the attorney general and the
Department both as a matter of law[30] and policy.[31] Some research demonstrates that presidential priorities matter to U.S.
attorneys,[32] and the recent purge of several U.S. attorneys by Attorney General Gonzalez, ostensibly for failing to adhere to the
political priorities of the Department, testiÖes to this centralized in×uence.[33]
High-proÖle controversies such as the Gonzalez purge aside, the fact remains that the United States employs a highly decentralized
structure of federal prosecution in a modern environment that increasingly incentivizes centralized in×uence. The question becomes
how federal prosecutors can accommodate both local and centralized in×uences, especially should those in×uences incline towards
different priorities. Because federal prosecutors’ discretion deÖnes the practical scope of federal criminal law in their jurisdictions,
[34] achieving a better empirical understanding of the forces that in×uence prosecutorial decision making helps clarify the nature of
political accountability in the federal justice system. And as the case study of obscenity prosecutions will demonstrate, we can also
gain insight into the extent to which culture wars shape legal and political outcomes.
1. Pornography, obscenity, and the culture wars
Justice Potter Stewart famously opined about hard-core pornography that “I know it when I see it.”[35] “Pornography,” however, is a
cultural or political distinction, rather than a legal one. Several decades of Supreme Court case law have established three legal
categories of sexually-explicit material: the indecent, the obscene, and child pornography. The broadest category, indecency, concerns
material that, while suitable for consenting adults, may be regulated as to the time, place, and manner of its distribution. A radio
station may play George Carlin’s “Seven Dirty Words” monologue, but not during hours when children are likely to hear it.[36]
Bookstores may sell indecent sexual materials, subject to city zoning ordinances.[37] Congress cannot constitutionally prohibit adult
access to indecent commercial telephone messages (phone sex).[38] In contrast to indecent material, the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of obscene material can be criminalized, although its possession cannot.[39] From the 1950s until the 1970s, the Court
struggled to differentiate obscenity and indecency, ultimately arriving at a distinction articulated in Miller v. California.[40] Obscene
material is that which, when judged by contemporary community standards, appeals to the prurient interest, depicts patently
offensive sexual content speciÖcally proscribed by law, and when taken as a whole lacks signiÖcant literary, artistic, scientiÖc, or
political value (the “LAPS” test). As a result, what constitutes obscenity will vary by jurisdiction; obscenity in Provo can be very
different from obscenity in San Francisco. Finally, the Supreme Court ruled in New York v. Ferber that the manufacture, sale, and
distribution of child pornography may be criminalized,[41] and in Osborne v. Ohio held that possession of child pornography may be
prohibited.[42]
Not everyone agrees with the Court’s three-tiered approach, however. For many conservative Christians and some feminists, sexually
explicit material of any kind constitutes a grave social harm. Anti-pornography groups justify their priorities not only on the basis of
abstract moral positions, but on the argument that pornography harms women and children.[43] Such activism began in earnest
during the Reagan administration with the 1986 Meese Commission on Pornography,[44] and has been extended today by groups
such as Morality in Media, the American Family Association, Concerned Women for America, and Focus on the Family, all of which
place anti-pornography efforts near the top of their political agendas.[45] For example, Concerned Women for America, which argues
that the consumption of adult pornography leads to pedophilia, includes anti-pornography efforts as one of its six core mission values.
[46]
These advocates employ a variety of strategies to advance their political views.[47] While they cannot constitutionally criminalize all
sexually explicit material, obscenity prosecutions can help rid society of the worst types of pornography (and, these groups might
hope, deter the production and marketing of other adult material as well). During the 2000 presidential campaign, the American
Family Association convinced George W. Bush to agree in writing to prioritize the enforcement of obscenity laws.[48] Although the
Department has long had a division devoted to obscenity and child pornography (the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, or
CEOS), Attorney General Gonzales in 2005 announced the creation of an additional task force within the Criminal Division designed
to focus exclusively on obscenity prosecutions,[49] declaring obscenity prosecutions “one of the top priorities” of the Department.
[50] Observers have suggested that one of the eight U.S. attorneys terminated by Attorney General Gonzalez in the controversial
Örings of 2006 may have been released because he was insufÖciently aggressive in prosecuting obscenity.[51] If it is true that U.S.
attorneys respond to the centralized forces of presidential and attorney general in×uence, then we hypothesize that there will be more
obscenity prosecutions brought by U.S. attorneys under the George W. Bush administration than under the Clinton administration.
But it also is possible that federal prosecutors respond primarily to local political values—regional cultural norms that the popular
press and academics have termed the “culture war.” James Davidson Hunter popularized the idea of a culture war, which he describes
as a new political alignment deÖned by competition between orthodox Americans who adhere to “an external, deÖnable and
transcendent authority,” and progressives, “deÖned by the spirit of the modern age, a spirit of rationalism and subjectivism.”[52]
Hunter’s work spawned a vigorous debate about the intersection of politics and culture in America, which includes empirical studies
that question his conclusion.[53] One qualitative study based on 200 interviews with middle-class suburban Americans concludes
that most Americans are “moderate in their views, even on so-called moral issues.”[54] Another study that analyzed American
National Election Studies (ANES) and General Social Survey (GSS) data uncovered a moderate electorate with extensive consensus on
social issues, and concludes that it is the “political class,” rather than the electorate more generally, that has polarized.[55]
Yet electoral maps depicting a nation of consistently red and blue states suggest support for the culture war hypothesis. Abramowitz
and Saunders, relying upon 2004 ANES data, concluded that although claims of a culture war were overstated, there were still
signiÖcant moral divisions within the electorate.[56] Another study also found qualitative differences in public opinion between red
and blue states.[57] Both in the courtroom and at the ballot box, social issues achieved a new prominence in politics, [58] and
“polarization seems to be occurring on issues that are important to politically active religious conservatives, such as abortion,
sexuality, divorce law, school prayer, and the like.”[59] If the culture war theory is correct, and if federal prosecutors respond to local
political values, we hypothesize that there will be more federal obscenity prosecutions in red states than in blue states.
Sometimes federal prosecutors must navigate competing political demands, and obscenity prosecutions provide the ideal case study
with which to evaluate this situation. Consider two contrasting examples: child pornography prosecutions and immigration
prosecutions. Analyzing the former provides little insight into potential tensions between localized and centralized in×uence because
child pornography is reviled everywhere. Assuming the culture war theory is correct (which we examine below), pursuing obscenity
claims is likely to be salient only for certain political constituencies, and those constituencies will vary by locale and by presidential
administration. This variance allows us to study the relative in×uence of centralizing and localizing forces of in×uence. Unlike
immigration prosecutions, which along with drug prosecutions provide the bulk of federal prosecutors’ day-to-day workload,[60]
obscenity investigations are rare, discretionary and resource-intensive.[61] One has to seek them out and want to prosecute them.
Assuming that our two initial hypotheses are correct, we can examine what happens when federal prosecutors in blue states are
asked by a conservative administration to prioritize obscenity cases, or when prosecutors in red states are beholden to a more liberal
administration with little interest in stamping out pornography. Although it is a close case—precisely because no one has empirically
studied the comparative in×uence of centralizing and decentralizing forces—we hypothesize that federal prosecutors will be in×uenced
more by local political demands than by centralized control.
II. Data and methods
We relied upon multiple data sources and mixed methods to test our hypotheses: records of state and local obscenity indictments, a
dataset of federal obscenity referrals and prosecutions, and Önally, interviews with law enforcement, adult industry representatives,
and their lawyers.
We aggregated data on state and local obscenity indictments using a newspaper index search of Westlaw in order to determine the
distribution of state and local anti-obscenity efforts. Unlike federal prosecutions, which are archived in a national database, there is
no simple way to identify state and local prosecutions. Moreover, it is not possible to study prosecutorial behavior by examining state
judicial opinions. Most obscenity cases, as with most criminal cases, result in plea bargains; as a result, there are few published judicial
opinions. We therefore used Westlaw’s “allnews” database to search for newspaper accounts of indictments brought by state or local
law enforcement ofÖcials between January 1, 1990 and June 30, 2006.[62] We excluded articles that did not meet the criteria for
obscenity or identify unique cases. We removed discussions of (a) indictments for child pornography, consistent with the three-tier
deÖnition and consistent with previous research on obscenity,[63] (b) indictments for “obscene acts” (misdemeanors involving
behavior such as overly-aggressive lap dances and prostitution), (c) indictments for zoning violations (unless they concerned the
distribution of obscenity), and (d) indictments for pandering obscenity to a minor, which usually involved merely indecent material.
These criteria yielded a dataset of 108 defendants. We were unable to obtain reliable data on case disposition because newspapers
reported dispositions in less than half of the cases studied. Two situations that involved what we term “hyper-indictment” were
excluded from the dataset as outliers and are discussed separately.
There are two potential difÖculties in employing the Westlaw database to study state and local indictments. First, not every
newspaper in the country is included in the database, creating the potential for selection bias. Yet the database is very extensive, and
sources are not selected by ideology. A second concern is that newspapers in conservative jurisdictions might be more willing to
publish stories about obscenity, resulting in underreporting of the total number of obscenity indictments in liberal areas. However,
criminal indictments involving pornographers would be newsworthy anywhere given the sensationalistic nature of these stories.[64]
To investigate the behavior of federal prosecutors, we identiÖed all obscenity referrals to federal prosecutors from 1995 to 2007
using the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse (TRAC) database at Syracuse University. Department policy requires that
federal prosecutors document their ongoing criminal caseloads. TRAC aggregates this information, which allows us to observe the
cases that are referred to federal prosecutors by federal agents, the types of referrals that are declined (meaning the prosecutor
refused to Öle charges) or prosecuted, and the outcome of cases that are pursued. In multivariate analysis using this data, our
dependent variable was whether an agency referral was prosecuted. The dataset provided by TRAC contained information on 579
obscenity referrals during this 14-year time period.
We added background information relevant to each referral and to variables believed to be relevant to the culture war. Our data
spanned two presidential administrations; that of Bill Clinton and that of George W. Bush. Our classiÖcation of state political culture
relied on Abramowitz and Saunders’ red-purple-blue typology, which classiÖes states based on the degree of popular support for
Republican incumbent George Bush and Democratic challenger John Kerry as determined by 2004 National Exit Poll results.[65]  
Red states strongly favored Bush, blue states favored Kerry, and the vote share in purple states was narrower than a 55-45% split.
Their analysis excluded Öve states (Hawaii, North Dakota, South Dakota, West Virginia, and Wyoming) and the District of Columbia;
as a result, we categorized these as red or blue states based on whether they voted for the Republican or Democratic candidate in the
2004 presidential elections. The dataset provided by TRAC included six referrals from Puerto Rico and three referrals from Guam,
which we excluded from our analysis of state political culture.
Finally, we coded the gender of the assistant U.S. attorneys that handled each referral. We do this to overcome a potential ×aw in the
Abramowitz and Saunders typology as applied to obscenity prosecutions. Almost no one who subscribes to the culture war thesis
doubts that social conservatives seek to limit pornography. But it is possible that some constituencies within the progressive or left-
leaning blue states may wish to do so — Catherine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin’s efforts to pass an anti-pornography law in
Minneapolis in the 1990s is one example.[66] The normative and empirical scholarship on the relationship between feminist politics
and anti-pornography efforts is mixed, however, and such an ambivalent relationship is an insufÖcient basis for our hypotheses. [67]  
This is especially true since not a single interviewee we spoke with believed that feminism and “left-leaning” political groups were
driving anti-pornography efforts after the early 1990s.   Nonetheless, we coded for the gender of federal prosecutors who were given
these obscenity referrals in order to test our null hypothesis that female prosecutors are not more likely to bring obscenity charges than
are their male counterparts.
Because we cannot assume that every obscenity prosecution is created equal, we also identiÖed the nature of the lead charge in each
referral. Since the 1970s, the total number of federal criminal offenses has increased greatly.[68] Because there are many more
crimes that federal prosecutors can charge defendants with, there is the potential for “charge stacking,” a prosecutorial strategy by
which prosecutors indict defendants for multiple offenses. For example, a person selling methamphetamines could also be charged
with tax fraud and false statement offenses for failing to report the proceeds of the drug deals on federal tax forms. Stacking charges
is useful both in encouraging defendants to plea bargain—prosecutors offer to drop some charges in exchange for guilty pleas on
others—and also in increasing prison terms for especially heinous defendants.[69]
Given that defendants are often charged with multiple criminal violations, the Department requires that prosecutors determine a
lead charge when assigned a matter. A lead charge is deÖned as “the substantive statute that is the primary basis for the referral.”[70]
Although all of the referrals in our federal dataset come from the program area “Obscenity,” many of these defendants were charged
with multiple offenses. This raises the possibility that some prosecutions deÖned as obscenity-related could be purposeful attempts
by federal prosecutors to eradicate sexually explicit material, while others could be efforts by prosecutors to stack an obscenity
charge on a more serious primary offense in order to help compel a plea bargain or increase a prison term. We used the lead charge
information to address these potential differences in prosecutorial strategy. The deÖnition of what constitutes a lead charge
pertaining to obscenity is open to interpretation; we thus relied on the legal expertise of the lead author to assess charges that truly
appeared to be obscenity. Our classiÖcation sought to identify lead charges that unquestionably concerned the prosecution of
obscene material; a list of these charges is provided in the Appendix. We coded these lead charges as core obscenity, as opposed to the
remainder of cases, which we coded as stacked—matters where obscenity likely was used as a charge stacking technique.[71] The
overwhelming majority of stacked lead charges were unrelated to obscenity—for example, rioting or “liquor violations on Indian land.”
We placed child pornography in the stacked category because it is uniformly condemned, thus its prosecution does not indicate a
cultural position on adult pornography. Some of these cases involved a charge we had identiÖed as core obscenity, but not as a lead
charge; for the purpose of our analysis, these also were considered stacked.
Using multivariate logit analysis, we considered all prosecutions that involved a charge from the federal program area “obscenity,”
both with and without a core obscenity lead charge. Our dependent variable was the choice to prosecute, and we ran two regressions:
the Örst measured the effect of our independent variables on the decision to prosecute core obscenity, and the second measured the
effect of those same independent variables on the decision to prosecute stacked charges.
Finally, to provide a better understanding of our quantitative Öndings, we conducted eleven interviews of professionals involved in
obscenity law, including attorneys involved with defense and prosecution of these charges, and individuals creating and reporting on
pornography (e.g., directors of and reporters on adult movies).[72] All interviews were conducted by the lead author and were open-
ended, lasting roughly thirty to sixty minutes; interview transcripts were iteratively reviewed to identify recurring themes. We
provide excerpts from the interviews that exemplify these themes and explain our Öndings in the context of both state and federal
prosecutions.
III. Results
We Örst review prosecutorial behavior in state and local obscenity indictments, in order to determine if the red-blue-purple state
typology is a reliable metric by which to evaluate federal prosecutors. We then analyze obscenity referrals to federal prosecutors,
controlling for both presidential administration and local political culture. Overall, we Önd that local political culture in×uences both
state and federal prosecutorial behavior, and that federal prosecutors have developed sophisticated responses to the pressures
created by sometimes competing sources of political in×uences.
          A. State and local obscenity indictments
Our examination of the incidence of state and local obscenity indictments provides a baseline to evaluate federal obscenity
prosecutions. Our results, which are provided in Table 1, suggest that state and local indictments are overwhelmingly a red state
phenomenon. Even when two outlier cases which involve large numbers of indictments by a single prosecutor (a strategy we term
“hyper-indictment”) are excluded, the relationship between state political culture and obscenity prosecutions is evident. Sixty-two
percent of all obscenity indictments were brought in red states, compared to just 30% in purple states and 8% in blue states.
Furthermore, all purple state indictments occurred in either Ohio or Florida, two states notable for their evangelical constituents’
opposition to pornography, according to our interview respondents. Every obscenity indictment in Florida occurred in the mid-state
region surrounding Orlando and Tampa northward. In addition, 15 of Ohio’s 19 indictments came from the greater Cincinnati area.
Cincinnati has a long-running feud with Hustler publisher Larry Flynt that was recounted in the movie The People v. Larry Flynt. The city
also indicted the curator of the Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center for showing a Robert Mapplethorpe exhibit.[73] If we consider
these cases to be situated in local islands of conservative political culture, over 90% of all state and local obscenity indictments in the
United States occurred in these areas: red states, central-northern Florida, and Cincinnati.[74]
It is unlikely that the variation between red states and blue states in local obscenity prosecutions is due to differences in the
underlying amount of obscene material. Obscenity is not like other federal crimes; prosecutions for cocaine distribution, for example,
are more likely in certain cities (San Diego, Miami) because they are international drug importation hubs. The greater incidence of
prosecutions for cocaine distribution does not necessarily mean that prosecutors in San Diego are more likely to prosecute, but
rather that San Diego has far more agency referrals. Obscenity is not comparable, because although cocaine is cocaine wherever it is
located, obscenity is not. Until a jury renders a decision or a plea bargain is reached, it is impossible to determine the amount of
obscene material in a given region; instead, prosecution determines the amount of obscenity in a district. Moreover, the amount of
pornography cannot serve as a proxy for the amount of obscenity because pornography often is classiÖed as indecent rather than
obscene. Furthermore, the internet has made it possible to obtain obscene material regardless of location. If prosecutors in a
conservative area wish to charge an individual with obscenity, they can join a website, download content they deem to be obscene in
their district, and then Öle charges.[75]
Our interview respondents offered a more persuasive explanation for the disparity between red states and blue states. They agreed
that obscenity cases are more likely to be brought in culturally conservative regions for two reasons. First, conservative (usually
evangelical) community members want these cases prosecuted and prosecutors respond to this political in×uence; second, it is easier
for prosecutors to win these cases under the Miller standard where community values are conservative—and prosecutors want to
win.
All of the interview respondents, whether they were involved in prosecution or defense, agreed that obscenity prosecutions were
politically motivated and respond to the demands of conservative constituencies. One noted that public outcry often leads to
investigations, particularly when someone goes into a video store “to rent a porn movie, and sees something shocking to the
conscience . . . You have more support for obscenity prosecutions in more conservative and more religious communities [as well as in]
small communities, where everyone knows what everyone else does.” Another suggested that the increasing number of adult
bookstores, coupled with the increasingly extreme nature of material, created citizen activism to which prosecutors respond
“because politicians [prosecutors] want to make their constituencies happy.” This trend was prevalent in the Bible Belt because
“citizens are more likely to issue complaints, and religious views affect the community standards.” Defense attorneys and members of
the adult entertainment industry agreed that conservative Christian groups were the constituency demanding obscenity
prosecutions. When asked why prosecutors bring obscenity cases, one respondent commented, “to make political hay. Local
prosecutors are elected, and they want to be able to say, ‘I closed down an adult bookstore.’” The South and the Midwest were
mentioned as examples of places where local prosecutors were most likely to try and appeal to “crazy religious people.” Somewhat
surprisingly, none of the interviewees suggested that feminists were a major political force pushing for obscenity prosecutions.[76]
Interview respondents also argued that conservative communities were more likely to convict under the Miller standard, and that
probability of success was a critical component to these prosecutions. An attorney suggested “prosecutors are political animals. If it
helps their careers, they will bring these suits. If it doesn’t, they won’t. You will see more [cases] where the area is conservative
Christian, like Oklahoma City, Memphis, and Tallahassee.” Another attorney reafÖrmed the importance of prosecutorial victory,
because “prosecutions arise only when there is both ideological commitment and political payoff . . . without political beneÖt, even
those ideologically disposed to bring these cases won’t prosecute.” This observation is supported in the literature; the ability of
prosecutors to win a case is a crucial element in the decision whether to Öle an indictment in the Örst place.[77] This explains why
prosecutors in blue states may not prosecute obscenity even if they personally would prefer to do so.
          B. Federal obscenity prosecutions
Both the quantitative and qualitative evidence prove that local political culture affects the decision making of state and local
prosecutors. This Önding, however, provides only a limited test of prosecutorial discretion, because state and local prosecutors are
accountable largely to one constituency: local political forces. More interesting questions of prosecutorial discretion arise with
federal prosecutors, who theoretically are responsive to both local political in×uence as well as to national actors such as the
president and the attorney general. Consequently, we sought to determine the extent to which federal prosecutors’ decisions to
pursue obscenity charges were responsive to local political culture, centralized partisan forces, or both.
We begin by reviewing the number of agency referrals to federal prosecutors over time. Our results, presented in Figure 1, list the
total number of referrals containing an obscenity-related charge (whether a core obscenity charge or a stacked charge),
disaggregated by prosecutions and declinations. Consistent with expectations, there were generally more obscenity referrals and
obscenity prosecutions during the Bush administration than during the Clinton administration. Yet the number of referrals with any
relationship to obscenity was small in every year; in 2005, the year with the greatest number of referrals, there were still less than
100 of these matters. If federal obscenity prosecutions are responsive to local political culture and serve as a front in the culture war,
the frequency of these battles is low. By comparison, a single prosecutor in Alabama, as discussed above, brought more charges
pertaining directly to obscenity in a single year than all of the federal matters involving obscenity in all years studied combined. That
said, even a few high proÖle federal obscenity convictions theoretically possess the potential to reshape the practices of the adult
entertainment industry by chilling (or deterring) speech.
Analyzing referrals more closely, it appears that federal prosecutors are affected by local political culture. Figure 2 lists the referrals
and prosecutions by state. There were 282 referrals made in red states, roughly the same number as those in blue and purple states
combined (288 referrals), despite the fact that blue and purple states are far more populous. However, the share of referrals
prosecuted was higher in blue and purple states; red states federal prosecutors prosecuted 37% of their referrals (105 of 282), while
those in purple states prosecuted 39% (59 of 153) and those in blue states prosecuted 52% (70 of 135). Federal prosecutors in red
states pursued more obscenity cases, but this is a function of the fact that they received more agency referrals. Judged solely by the
probability that a given referral would be prosecuted, federal prosecutors in blue states were more aggressive. This result was
unexpected and merited further inquiry.
We next disaggregated the data by state political culture, presidential administration, and type of charge (core obscenity or stacked)
as shown in Figure 3. Our Öndings reafÖrm that prosecutions are responsive to presidential administration. The probability of an
obscenity prosecution was larger during the Bush administration than during the Clinton administration; whether they were core
obscenity matters or matters where obscenity was included as a stacked charge. Although core obscenity prosecutions increased in
the Bush years, the relationship between these referrals and state political culture is unexpected. In both presidential
administrations, core obscenity was more likely to be prosecuted in blue states than in red or purple states. However, it is critical to
note that the number of referrals and prosecutions is so small (four blue state core obscenity prosecutions under Clinton, ten under
Bush) that it is not statistically signiÖcant. Finally, prosecutions that included a stacked obscenity charges were most likely to be
prosecuted in blue states during the Bush administration. It merits emphasis that stacked prosecutions in blue states greatly
outnumbered core-obscenity prosecutions in blue states, by a count of 97 to 37.
To understand this unexpected blue state dynamic better, we investigated this variance between state political culture, presidential
administration, and the emphasis on obscenity lead charges using multivariate analysis. Our regressions split referrals into those that
had a core obscenity lead charge and those that had a stacked charge. Our Öndings, which are presented in Table 2, make it evident
that federal prosecutors respond to presidential authority, but that they also appear to be in×uenced by local political culture. We controlled
for both state political culture (comparing blue and purple states to a baseline of red states) and for presidential administration, as
well as for the gender of the prosecutor. We discovered that prosecutions of crimes where obscenity was a stacked charge increased to a
statistically signiÖcant extent in both blue and purple states during the Bush administration. This outcome helps to explain the puzzle
mentioned above—namely why federal prosecutors in comparatively liberal states during the Bush administration had the greatest
probability of prosecuting obscenity cases. Because the choice to stack charges is discretionary, these Öndings suggest that federal
prosecutors may do so strategically to respond to both federal priorities and local political culture. Federal prosecutors in more liberal
areas are unlikely to increase their popularity or their probability of winning cases by prosecuting core obscenity. When faced with a
presidential administration that demands more focus on obscenity, blue state prosecutors prefer to pair obscenity charges with a lead
charge that is more likely to secure a conviction. This strategy makes it possible for federal prosecutors to respond to both local
political demands and the objectives of a more conservative administration. Also, such a strategy could help secure a jury conviction; a
jury in New York may be more likely to convict for an obscenity charge when that charge is linked to a defendant who is being
prosecuted primarily for another offense such as possession of child pornography, rather than when the obscenity charge is brought
as a stand-alone offense. Consistent with our null hypothesis, gender was not a signiÖcant in×uence in either core obscenity or
stacked prosecutions.
IV. Discussion
The results of our empirical analysis, as well as the views of our interview respondents, yield three conclusions. First, federal
prosecutors employ charge stacking as a way of navigating competing political forces. Second, there is some merit to the culture war
hypothesis. Third, competing prosecutorial strategies may work to undermine deterrence.
A. Charge stacking as a prosecutorial strategy
Scholars have documented the various ways that stacking multiple criminal charges can be used to facilitate plea bargains or enhance
criminal sentencing. In 2005, for example, prosecutors in New York alleged that Glen Marcus sexually enslaved women, tortured
them, and set up a pay-per-view site to display pictures of the abuse.[78] Marcus was indicted in New York on charges of civil rights
violations, sex trafÖcking, forced labor, and distributing obscene material. Interview respondents familiar with the case believed that
Marcus was prosecuted primarily for allegedly enslaving and torturing women rather than because he was distributing obscene
material. The obscenity charge was intended to encourage a guilty plea to the more serious charges.
Our research also suggests that charge stacking enables federal prosecutors to navigate the sometimes contradictory forces of
centralized priorities and local political culture. Regardless of a prosecutor’s personal views on obscenity, federal prosecutors have
strong incentives to accommodate the prosecutorial priorities of the attorney general.[79] This task can be difÖcult, however, when
those priorities are at odds with local political culture. As bad as it is to ignore an attorney general’s priorities, it probably is worse to
pursue them and lose, for such losses raise questions about prosecutorial competence.[80] Stacking obscenity on other charges like
sexual trafÖcking and rape provides a low-cost way of pursuing centralized priorities. Should the case go to trial, a jury ambivalent
about the obscenity charge will consider it in the context of an unsympathetic defendant.
These factors explain why prosecutors in blue and purple states stacked obscenity charges. Even in instances such as the Marcus case,
where charge stacking was used to encourage a guilty plea, it probably did not hurt the U.S. attorney in New York to be able to
reafÖrm her commitment to the priorities of the Department. Although our results are preliminary, the extent to which charge
stacking is used to navigate competing in×uences on prosecutorial agenda setting merits further study. Researchers should consider
lead charge areas that may con×ict with local political culture, such as civil rights prosecutions, hate crime prosecutions, or tax fraud
prosecutions in conservative districts, or the prosecution of low-level drug offenses (such as simple possession) in more progressive
areas. If true, charge stacking may serve yet another strategic purpose for federal prosecutors—it is a mechanism by which
decentralized institutions respond to the imperatives of an increasingly nationalized system of prosecutorial priorities.
B. Obscenity prosecutions and the culture war
In matters of obscenity, both local and federal red state prosecutors behave differently than prosecutors in blue states. Is this
disparity in itself evidence of a culture war?  As previously mentioned, scholars disagree about the depth and breadth of the culture
war. Most agree that political elites, a group to which prosecutors presumably belong, are more polarized than the electorate. The
more interesting question is whether this phenomenon provides hints of polarization in the voting public. Our Öndings suggest that
the electorate is polarized over the issue of obscenity, at least to a degree that allows political elites to strategically exploit those
cleavages.
Critics of the culture war thesis argue that elites are more polarized than voters because they are institutionally beholden to activist
groups.[81] For example, ideological voters are more likely to vote in primary elections, to volunteer for campaigns, and to donate
money to candidates.[82] Yet the Miller standard is based on community norms, creating a dependence on public opinion given that
prosecutors pursue cases they believe they are likely to win.[83] Although most cases will be settled with a guilty plea, prosecutors
must be prepared to convince a jury comprised of local voters that community standards have been violated. While there is systemic
selection bias in juries that excludes the poor, women, racial minorities, and the under- and over-educated,[84] juries are not sorted by
ideology. Red state prosecutors appear to be conÖdent of their ability to obtain conviction from a (relatively) random sample of
voters, suggesting that polarization may be deeper than skeptics have argued.
Although there are disparities between red and blue states, the incidence of these prosecutions is low. If conservative constituencies
favor obscenity prosecutions, and prosecutors are willing to engage a culture war for strategic purposes, why are these prosecutions
comparatively rare—especially given the dramatic expansion of extreme pornography available via the internet? Interview
respondents offered four explanations: lack of prosecutorial expertise, jurisdictional concerns, risk of backlash from other political
constituencies, and a “crowd-out” effect caused by the rise in child pornography.
First, prosecutors may be hesitant to try obscenity cases because they lack the prosecutorial expertise to do so. One respondent
noted that many district attorneys’ ofÖces do not try obscenity cases because their staff believed that they lacked the expertise in
Örst amendment law necessary to secure a conviction. Another prosecutor agreed that the ability to win the case was critical: “I
prefer clear-cut cases. If I don’t think I can secure a conviction, I won’t prosecute. We have an ethical duty not to Öle a claim without a
strong likelihood of victory.” The ability to win is a crucial consideration to prosecutors, and while prosecution in a red state may
increase odds of victory, prosecutors still may be unwilling to litigate cases with which they are unfamiliar.
A second reason is jurisdictional. One respondent noted that many of the most extreme websites involving bestiality, urination, and
gratuitous violence are not located in the United States, but in countries such as Germany or the Netherlands. One could target banks
that transact membership fees for these sites, but such an investigation and prosecution is beyond the capacity of all but the largest
law enforcement organizations. Jurisdictional constraints are less an issue for federal prosecutors, but resource constraints
nonetheless limit pursuit of high-proÖle obscenity indictments.
Third, prosecutors may fear that focusing on obscenity prosecutions could engender a public backlash. One defense attorney related
a story in which a local district attorney in a conservative district decided to pursue obscenity prosecutions aggressively, but faced
such widespread public opposition for perceived misallocation of prosecutorial resources that he promised not to bring more
indictments. An investigator echoed this dynamic, suggesting that citizens might not object to obscenity prosecutions per se, but
instead might feel that these prosecutions divert resources from prosecuting more serious crimes. He noted that, “[O]n a scale of one
to ten, most head prosecutors would rank [obscenity prosecutions] a three. They have to worry about other felonies like murders.
They have to allocate their resources.” Obscenity prosecutions may be highly salient for some constituents, but many crimes, such as
drug dealing, rape, homicide, and bank robberies, are salient for almost everyone. Sometimes—though interview respondents agreed
that such situations are the exception rather than the rule—obscenity prosecutions appear to be an elite-driven culture war to which
the general public does not subscribe.
Finally, the increased presence of child pornography may explain why a small number of obscenity crimes are prosecuted. The spread
of inexpensive digital cameras and the internet greatly facilitated the ability of potential child pornographers to manufacture and
distribute such content.[85] One interview respondent suggested that the growth in child pornography had encouraged anti-
pornography legislation more generally, noting that, “[C]hild pornography is a political football. Legislators will lump child
pornography with adult pornography and wrap us together.” This position is reasonable when one considers recent federal anti-
indecency laws such as the Child Online Protection Act and the P.R.O.T.E.C.T. Act. The presence of child pornography can be used to
highlight the ostensible link between adult pornography and harm to children, and thus make restrictions on the adult pornography
more politically palatable.
However, the framing device employed by anti-pornography advocates may prove counterproductive. Con×ating adult and child
pornography may yield law enforcement institutions with dual jurisdiction over both, such as the Child Exploitation and Obscenity
Section (CEOS) of the Justice Department. Yet every respondent agreed that prosecutors would choose to prosecute child
pornography before obscenity. A prosecutor noted that, “[C]hild pornography is a more serious offense. When we receive these
matters, they get prioritization because we rush to identify the children.” The growth in child pornography crowds out investigative
and prosecutorial attention to obscenity. An investigator noted that when law enforcement efforts against obscenity and child
pornography are combined, as they are with the CEOS, “[I]t’s hard to prioritize obscenity over child pornography. They need separate
resources, or else, understandably, obscenity will not be the priority.” This logic explains why Attorney General Gonzales created an
anti-obscenity task force within Main Justice that had authority to prosecute adult but not child pornography, even though the CEOS
already had the ability to prosecute obscenity. Absent the rapid growth in child pornography, the Bush administration would have
been able to devote more resources to the prosecution of obscenity.
Prosecutors can exacerbate, heighten, or magnify cultural cleavages through their case selection. But a case must be minimally salient
to jurors in the Örst place lest the prosecutor risk an acquittal or appear of overzealous. In interviews, law enforcement personnel and
defense attorneys cited the importance of local political culture in determining whether to prosecute obscenity cases. Our research
reveals a national culture skirmish over obscenity. Although voters in red states might not always prioritize the prosecution of
obscenity, prosecutors expect them to be more hostile toward obscenity than residents of blue states. Rather than thinking of the
culture war as a hot war between activist citizens, it can be thought of as a cold war driven by the political calculations of prosecutors
who know they can win cases by highlighting regional values.
C. The problem with prohibition
Although constituent demand helps explain the decision to Öle an obscenity indictment, there is one stark difference between the law
and the politics of obscenity: the case law is clear that not all pornography is obscene, but anti-pornography advocates rarely make
this distinction. Prosecutors re×ect this divide. Regulators approach the adult entertainment industry as a distasteful albeit legitimate
enterprise in which some businesses behave illegally. Their goal is to signal the permissible bounds of adult material. Prohibitionists, in
contrast, seek to eradicate pornography.
Regulators believe that the role of law enforcement is to send signals that facilitate self-policing by the adult entertainment industry.
One prosecutor interviewed focused only on particular types of content such as that involving bestiality, defecation, urination, Östing,
and simulated rape. He noted, “there is a perception that police and prosecutors are going out on wild raids—an assumption that these
suits are politically generated. Politics may play some part of it, but it’s not my job to legislate morality.” He believed that over time the
industry had learned what was likely to result in prosecution. In his estimation, forty to sixty percent of the industry tried “to do the
right thing,” especially larger companies that viewed themselves as mature businesses. This prosecutor, as well as a criminal
investigator, argued that when industry members chose to challenge the articulated boundaries, they did so purposefully, to appeal to
proÖtable niche markets.
Prohibitionists, however, seek to communicate that all pornography is prohibited, and they employ two unique strategies. The Örst,
hyper-indictment, has been described above.[86] The second is a multi-jurisdictional indictments strategy used exclusively by federal
prosecutors who venue-shop in order to Önd locales with the most restrictive community standards. For example, adult video
distributor Avram Freedberg agreed in 1991 to permanently close his business “after the Justice Department told him he’d be
prosecuted in as many districts as necessary to obtain convictions.”[87] Attorney General Thornburgh acknowledged that his barrage
of indictments in the early 1990s was designed to notify “large-scale producers of illegal hard-core pornography . . . [that] they will be
pursued in every state in the nation.”[88]
Supporters of this strategy argue that it is uncontroversial; the fact that a distributor shipped to Öfty cities where its material is not
considered obscene does not mitigate the fact that it shipped to one where the material is illegal. However, federal ofÖcials in written
memoranda and public speeches acknowledged that multi-jurisdictional cases were designed to “keep defense attorneys busy and
running around the country.”[89] Critics argue that multi-jurisdictional prosecutions constitute improper forum shopping. In the
federal prosecution of Cal Vista, a major manufacturer/distributor located in California, the FBI set up a sham video store in Broken
Arrow, Oklahoma in order to purchase Cal Vista’s Ölms. It was established at trial that the only videos Cal Vista shipped to Oklahoma
were those ordered by the FBI.[90]
Prohibitionists may also push the Miller test far beyond the boundaries of reasonable legal interpretation. Sample cases include
prosecuting a video store that stocked the John Waters movie Pink Flamingos despite the fact that the movie was not designed to
appeal to the prurient interest;[91] prosecuting an adult bookstore for selling a magazine containing nonsexual adult nudity;[92]
prosecuting the curator of the Cincinnati Contemporary Arts Center for hosting a Robert Mapplethorpe exhibition;[93] and
prosecuting parents who have taken nonsexual photos of their children in situations such as blowing “raspberries” on a mother’s
breast or taking a shower.[94] That these prosecutions rarely succeed is beside the point; the process is the punishment.[95] The
mother who had taken the photo of her six-year old blowing a raspberry on her breast was acquitted at trial, but only after being
forced to admit on the stand that she had had an online affair. The prosecutor responded to the acquittal by stating that he intended
to try her again.[96]
The problem for defendants is that it is difÖcult to determine not only what a jury will Önd obscene but also the type of prosecutor one
may face. Interview respondents from the adult entertainment industry and their lawyers agreed that communities in the South had
more restrictive standards, but could not predict where lines would be drawn. One attorney, when asked whether the industry picked
up prosecutorial signals about the permissible boundaries of adult content, said, “I don’t know what prosecutors will choose to try.”
Another claimed, “[T]he industry is lousy at getting signals from prosecutors. There is no Magic 8-Ball to determine what you will be
prosecuted for. Some types of content are more high risk, such as scat and bestiality, but the prosecutor might decide to set the bar
lower.” An industry representative was more skeptical claiming, “there are no objective standards. A movie may sit on a shelf for years,
nothing will happen, then suddenly there is an indictment.” It is tempting to dismiss these views as strategically feigned ignorance, and
for a narrow category of extreme material, such skepticism is justiÖed. But prohibitionists are willing to prosecute far beyond this
category—in some instances the frustrations of defense attorneys seem quite reasonable. Moreover, a risk-averse strategy of
“assume the worst” is not a viable option because attempting to comply with the preferences of a prohibitionist would require going
out of business.
As a result, prohibitionists undermine the signaling efforts of regulators. Signaling is difÖcult by nature because deÖnitions of
obscenity vary by jurisdiction. But theoretically, producers and distributors could attempt to conform to these geographic differences
if prosecutors employed obscenity indictments to articulate the standards. Yet prohibitionists reduce prosecutorial signaling to
background noise. If any type of adult material may be prosecuted, why not market the most extreme types, which often are the most
proÖtable? This is especially true as many members of the adult entertainment industry focus on the Önancial costs of obscenity
prosecutions. An adult director suggested that the goal of prosecutors “is to bankrupt you, not jail you.” Consequently, he continued to
market extreme content, partially out of moral conviction, but largely because it was proÖtable to do so. He believed that he faced
prosecution no matter what type of content he produced, so he preferred to confront trial with a large cash reserve.
Inconsistent regulatory enforcement can be ineffective, and obscenity prosecutions risk this problem. Just as anti-pornography
advocates, by con×ating adult pornography and child pornography, created institutions that did not prosecute many obscenity cases,
prohibitionist prosecutors may create a legal environment in which the rational business strategy may be to create obscene rather
than indecent material.
V. Conclusion
Scholars seek to understand not only the ways political forces shape the decision making of prosecutors, but also how cultural
distinctions between regions in the United States translate into observable policy differences. By studying obscenity prosecutions, a
policy area highly salient to the conservative evangelical community, we gain insight into whether there is a culture war in America,
and if so, how prosecutors strategically respond to its in×uence. Our evidence of state and local obscenity prosecutions clearly
documents a relatively deep culture war, exhibiting regional differences in opinion. The experience of federal prosecutors, however, is
more nuanced—an understandable outcome given the competing political pressures they face. While most obscenity prosecutions
occurred in red states, the willingness of blue state federal prosecutors to take these cases is surprising. Or rather, it is surprising until
one understands the strategies of blue state federal prosecutors, who bring obscenity cases not primarily to limit pornographic
material, but rather as a means of charge stacking defendants accused of other more serious offenses. By use of this technique,
federal prosecutors accommodated the Bush administration’s anti-obscenity efforts without having to bring the types of obscenity
cases unlikely to appeal to blue state juries.
Our interviews of those involved with obscenity prosecutions support this conclusion. Obscenity prosecutions are more likely to
occur in conservative communities because prosecutors respond to the political demands of citizens, as well as the fact that trying
these cases in conservative communities makes it easier to secure a conviction. Prosecution is an inherently political act, and
prosecutors do not like to lose. The fact that obscenity prosecutions are comparatively rare even in red states can be explained by
prosecutors’ fear of trying unfamiliar cases, jurisdictional concerns, the risk of public backlash from political constituencies concerned
about other areas of criminal conduct, and the growth of, and consequent need to prosecute, child pornography.
Prosecutors exhibited differences not only in strategies, but also in goals; some tried to regulate the more extreme producers of adult
entertainment, while others tried to eradicate pornography entirely from their districts by employing hyper-indictment or multi-
jurisdictional approaches. Which strategy is normatively correct is open to debate, but the prohibitionist approach is problematic for
two reasons. First, it is at odds with Öfty years of case law that distinguishes between indecency and obscenity. It is one thing to make
good faith efforts to reshape case law, but another to ×ood the local courts with so many obscenity indictments that judges complain.
Second, the prohibitionist strategy risks encouraging the creation of the very type of pornography that is most legally and ethically
questionable. In culture wars, as in wars more generally, we must always look askance on Pyrrhic victories.
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